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Liberal Authority in Yeltsin’s Russia
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Résumé
Beaucoup d’encre à coulé sur l’échec de la présidence de Yeltsin et sur la transformation de 
la société russe depuis 1991. Mais on a peu étudié la participation des démocraties libérales 
établies au soutien du « superprésidentialisme » autoritaire de Yeltsin, coupé des évolutions 
politiques, ni le lien entre ce soutien et la nature autoritaire du projet démocratique libéral 
moderne lui-même. Un examen de la culture et de l’histoire du syndicalisme russe, ainsi que 
de la participation des représentants du syndicalisme international, montre que l’on peut 
voir dans l’absence de remise en question des rapports sociaux de production, au cours des 
années 1990, le paradigme d’une dynamique autoritaire axée sur l’élite politique plutôt que 
sur les membres du syndicat. La préoccupation du régime, avec le soutien international, 
était le démantèlement des relations économiques et des institutions sociales soviétiques. 
Au vu de la culture et de l’histoire des syndicats russes, le recours des syndicats à une 
stratégie de partenariats sociaux pour tenter de conserver une place dans une ère nouvelle, 
en sus de l’écroulement du système de sécurité sociale, a renforcé l’inertie d’une hiérarchie 
syndicale du haut vers le bas. Le résultat? Bien entendu, une ère marquée par une absence 
de responsabilité politique, éthique politique reflétant non un autoritarisme inhérent à la 
Russie, mais la nature autoritaire de la modernité libérale elle-même.
1 Dr. Baker is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Nipissing University.  Dr. 
Baker holds a Ph. D. from York University’s Graduate Programme in Social and Political Thought. 
From 1997 to 2004, Dr. Baker lived in Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Hungary, 
conducting research and working in post-secondary educational reform projects.  Along with her 
work on Russian trade unions, Dr. Baker’s research activities include post-Soviet and Western 
international education projects, liberal arts transformation efforts in Canada and Central Asia, and 
global issues of social justice, particularly as encountered in the practice of sociology as a liberal 
arts project.  Her doctoral dissertation addressed the conflictual relationship between capitalism and 
democracy by tracing the problematic transformation post-Soviet Russia experienced during the era 
of the Yeltsin regime, particularly as it played out for Russian trade unions and petroleum-based 
communities in the Khanty-Mansisk region of Western Siberia.  Contact:  normajobaker@gmail.
com 
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Abstract
While much has been written on the failure of the Yeltsin presidency and the transformation 
of Russian society since 1991, little work has been done that illustrates the participation 
of established liberal democracies in supporting Yeltsin’s authoritarian, politically 
unresponsive ‘superpresidentialism,’ or linking this support to the authoritarian nature of 
the modern liberal democratic project itself.  By examining Russian trade union culture and 
history, as well as international trade union representative involvement, this paper argues 
that the persistent neglect of unions in the 1990s to challenge social relations of production 
can be understood as paradigmatic of an authoritarian dynamic focused on the political 
elite rather than on their membership.  With international support, the regime’s concern 
was with the dismantling of Soviet economic relations and social institutions.  Working 
from the culture and history of Russian trade unions, the unions’ efforts to retain a place 
in the new era through a strategy of ‘social partnership,’ combined with the collapse of 
the social welfare system, reinforced a top-down inertia characteristic of the unions.  The 
result, predictably, was an era marked by a politics of irresponsibility, a political ethic is 
not indicative of an inherent Russian authoritarianism, but that of the authoritarian nature 
of the liberal modernity itself.
Spread the truth - the laws of economics are like the laws of engineering.  One set of 
laws works everywhere.
Why should the status of the majority of the population deteriorate as a result of the 
transition of one social system to another?  No serious justification for this thesis 
can be found in the literature.  In fact, there is and can be no reasoned evidence that 
the social and labour status of workers will inevitably deteriorate as a result of a 
democratic, antitotalitarian revolution, much less that there is no alternative to such 
deterioration.
2  Lawrence Summers, in 1991, then chief economist of the World Bank (quoted in Reddaway and 
Glinski, 2001: 237).  
3  Rakitskaya  (2004: 33). 
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Introduction
With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1991, liberal democracy presented itself to the 
world as a political regime unequalled in its capacity to satisfy the majority of the globe’s 
inhabitants.  Russians opted for liberal democracy in a seemingly overnight rush to join the 
‘civilised world’.  Russia’s president Boris Yeltsin, having been broadcast across the globe 
defying an attempted coup, joined the world stage as liberal democracy’s latest hero and 
Russia’s citizens anticipated a new era in which their concerns and desires for the future 
would weigh into the newly-independent country’s political equation.  Russia’s post-Soviet 
transition was undertaken with optimism and a great deal of support from Western leaders 
and institutions, guided and influenced by the political and economic elite of established 
liberal democratic polities.  The vibrant Russian democratic movement, arising from the 
hothouse atmosphere of perestroika and glasnost, had oriented the new direction of Russia 
toward the liberal capitalist world.  Western governments, institutions, and the scholarly 
community had provided advice and assistance; such expertise would help Russia in the 
transition, and was indeed necessary to the transition process itself.  
By the time Boris Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve 1999, Russia was in a state of 
profound political, social, and economic exhaustion, and commentators would have been 
hard-pressed to find a Russian citizen who could articulate the enthusiasm of August 1991. 
The decade had seen the country careen from crisis to crisis:  wage arrears, capital flight, 
an unresponsive political leadership, the collapse of a social safety net, an untrustworthy 
banking system, vicious civil unrest within the country’s own borders - there seemed to be 
little reason to celebrate Russia’s transition to democracy.  A decade which had started out 
with such good will and excitement had fizzled out, yielding a political landscape barren 
of optimism.   The credibility of liberal democracy had been profoundly undermined 
within Russia.  
As organisations representing Russian workers, the trade unions in post-Soviet Russia hold 
an important place in understanding the derailed dynamic of the transition.   Given the 
crucial social location of Soviet trade unions in maintaining organisation of, and social 
services provision to Russian workers, the trade unions served as a prism to interpret 
institutional and societal responses to Russia’s systemic experience of transformation.  
Trade unions in Russia were integral to the social architecture of the Soviet Union, and 
struggled with their location in the new era.  The experience of the unions illustrate a more 
general challenge not only with the post-Soviet transition, but with the inhibited nature 
of liberal modernity’s relationship to democracy, a structure founded on anti-democratic 
social relations of production.  As such, I argue that the Yeltsin era can be seen as a pivotal 
moment which illustrates not the inherent conservatism or political masochism of Russian 
society, but of the authoritarian nature of liberal democracy itself.
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One of the most enduring histories of the present on modern liberal democracy to be found 
is in the work of Canadian political theorist C. B. Macpherson.  Macpherson’s analyses of 
liberal democratic modernity can be seen as an important discursive intervention within an 
ongoing dialogue on an alternative, transformative project contemporary social relations. 
In The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, Macpherson (1977) notes that throughout 
its history, liberal democracy is generally understood as composed of two potentially 
conflictual elements:  the market and the development of human freedom.  Whereas liberal 
democracy holds “basic unconscious assumptions” of “capitalist market societies,” it 
justifies itself by claiming to allow for human development in its operations (Macpherson, 
1977: 1).  For Macpherson, although liberal democracy arose within capitalist relations, 
its emphasis upon human developmental capabilities does not need to remain permanently 
coupled with those relations.  In fact, what is important is “the recognition of how deeply 
the market assumptions about the nature of man and society have penetrated liberal-
democratic theory” (Macpherson, 1977: 21).  Indeed, much of Macpherson’s scholarship 
is dedicated to the resuscitation of the democratic project from within liberal / market-
oriented relations.  
With the end of the Soviet project and the loss of an alternative model of social 
organisation, political discourse was fundamentally transformed into a monologue spoken 
in the language of market fundamentalism.  Within Russia, a political thesis was founded 
upon the statement that ‘there is no alternative’ to liberal democracy. This was illustrated 
by what came to be called the Washington Consensus.  Liberal economist Anders Åslund 
classifies this group as “radical reformers” that included American and Western liberal 
macroeconomists, “the best economists in the East” such as Leszek Balcerowicz, Vaclav 
Klaus, and Yegor Gaidar, and international financial institutions including the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (Åslund, 2007: 33).  Thus was a liberal authoritarian 
approach directed upon the transformation of Russian society, shorn of discussions 
regarding the social and developmental aspects of democratic theory and locked into 
market assumptions about modern social organisation.
Similarly, the work of James C. Scott on what he calls state simplifications and authoritarian 
high modernism are particularly relevant to Russia under the Yeltsin regime.  For Scott 
(1998: 87: 3), the history of European statecraft and state development illustrate optic 
models of  simplification that serve as administrative “maps that, when allied with state 
power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be remade.”  These simplification 
schemes are undertaken to provide “rationalising and standardising what was a social 
hieroglyph into a legible and administratively more convenient format” so as to facilitate 
taxation, conscription, and state capacity (Scott, 1998: 3).4  As powerful elites undertake 
4  Scott’s argument is interesting in the post-Soviet context, given his analysis of twentieth century 
Russian history and politics.  For Scott, Lenin (amongst others) is a prime example of a powerful 
revolutionary leader whose faith in high modernism “envisioned a sweeping rational engineering 
of all aspects of social life in order to improve the human condition,” (1998: 88) but “where it all 
goes wrong is when it is held by ruling elite with no commitment to democracy or civil rights and 
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high modernist projects, the vision developed through such map-making leaves aside much 
of the substance of the social; having been left aside, the population as democratic subjects 
are rendered administratively irrelevant in the post-Soviet transformation.
Much of the hand-wringing on the state of affairs in Russia since the 1990s has dwelt 
upon the ‘undeveloped’ character of civil society, particularly that of the trade unions 
(Connor, 1991; Cook, 1997; Cook, Orenstein and Rueschemeyer, 1999; Weigle, 2000; 
Howard 2003).  As trade unions in Russia had been established by and for the management 
of the workforce within Soviet communism, they were hardwired in the service of an 
authoritarian state.  Trade unions in the new regime could not, and would not, serve as 
representatives for that yet-to-be created democratic citizenry in the new Russia.  As 
the regime moved to enact key transitional moments, its representatives East and West 
argued that civil society could not be entrusted to find its own voice; the masses would be 
motivated by their own special interests, which would inhibit the establishment of a market 
economy.  A strategy of eliminating resistance to establishment of market relations and the 
establishment of a ‘normal society,’ remains within the literature today as a justification 
for the anti-democratic nature of the Yeltsin years (Åslund, 2007; Dominguez and Jones, 
2007).  
I would argue, however, that the problem was not primarily that of the limited developmental 
capability for political participation by the trade unions or the wider citizenry.  Rather, the 
problem was that under the Yeltsin regime, there was quite deliberately no effort made for 
a debate on the nature of post-Soviet society to occur.  The 1993 crushing of resistance by 
Yeltsin was only the most violent instance of ensuring no debate occurred.  Discussions 
on transformation focused on speed, not direction or substance.  This was particularly the 
case as the privatisation of the Russian economy was carried out.    Privatisation, it was 
argued, would wean the population from expectations of state support for the maintenance 
of the social; it would re-educate the citizenry to a market forces orientation, and overcome 
the deep-seated mentality of authoritarianism.  According to Åslund (2007: 3), Yeltsin’s 
‘radical reformers’ pursued their policies with the goal of shocking the populace into the 
who are therefore likely to use unbridled state power for its achievement” (1998: 89).  I find Scott’s 
argument here to reflect an unclear perception of ‘how it might go right,’ but the presentation of the 
administrative optics of state simplification provides a compelling illustration of the Yeltsin regime’s 
disregard for the population at large, as it sought to master the new Russia through liberal capitalist 
regimes of ruling.
  Åslund (2007: 3) writes that “the common conviction of the radical reformers was that these 
major market reforms had to be undertaken as comprehensively and swiftly as possible.”  
 A large literature exists on the implementation of privatisation in the 1990s.  See, for example, 
Alexander Radygin (199) and Maxim Boycko, Andrei Schliefer and Robert Vishy (199) for insights 
into the process and its justification through some of its proponents.  Critical analyses of the process 
include Joseph Blasi, Maya Kroumova and Douglas Kruse (1997).  One of the best illustrations of the 
scholarly mendacity involved in the Russian economic transition remains to be found in the work of 
anthropologist Janine Wedel (1998).
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new era:
[P]eople’s expectations had to be changed to render the systemic changes credible 
and irreversible.  Balcerowicz ... derived from Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive 
dissonance in social psychology, ‘that people are more likely to change their attitudes 
and behaviours if they are faced with radical changes in the environment, which they 
consider irreversible, than if those changes are only gradual.’
A policy based upon enforced disorientation was the order of the day.  Similarly, in a 
recently published collection of essays sponsored by the Club of Madrid, elite governance 
in the building of democracy is based upon liberal capitalist values and practices, rather 
than democratic discussions of desired social processes or outcomes.7  
The norms of liberal democratic capitalism were to be imposed upon Russian society, to 
ensure the rule of property laws and the right to vote in regular elections.  Discussion was 
irrelevant, and haste, explained through trite platitudes, was the order of the day:  there’s 
only one game in town, and in order to play that game, chasms can only be crossed in 
one leap; bicycles achieve stability only when speed is maintained, etc., etc.  Accepted 
domestic and international wisdom was proclaimed that no viable alternative to liberal 
market society existed, and Russian society was engaged in negotiating this new reality 
as imposed by local and global elites.  Yet the institutional and cultural framework 
established by the tsarist and Soviet era remained the unwieldy tools at hand to manage 
this negotiation.
Labour and Russia’s Authoritarian Development
The modern economic development of Russia was characterised by two inter-related 
elements:  the exploitation of its resources for sale on the burgeoning global market, and 
the management of the economy through centralised control in the tsarist and Soviet 
era (Dmitrieva, 199; Schiffer, 1998; Hill and Gaddy, 2003).  With decisions on revenue 
transfers and capital investment made by the powerful political centre, opportunity for 
local participation in economic decisions was minimal and institutionally limited (Wood, 
1987; Dienes, 1991; Van Brabant, 1992; Adams and Brick, 1993; Lavigne, 199.)  This 
power imbalance was evident in and played out through Soviet trade union structures, 
created and consolidated with the rise of Soviet power.
 
By the end of the Civil War, the trade unions were structured as interlocutors between 
Party and worker in the creation of the socialist labourer; this pedagogical function of 
the unions was complemented with the allocation of goods and services that the state 
offered to members of individual work collectives, such as housing, medical care, day 
7  As Ekiert and Gryzmaia-Busse (2007: 2) propose:  responsible public participation does not call 
into question either democracy or the rule of law.  It thus helps to fulfill one condition of democratic 
consolidation – an elite and popular consensus on the rules of the democratic game – and promotes 
democracy as the ‘only game in town.’
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care, vacations, and other basic elements of existence.  Within this tightly circumscribed 
role, the trade unions were junior partners in the Soviet management of workers.  The 
subordination of trade unions to the party-state was a process that unfolded with the 
disciplining of urban and agricultural workers into a coherent labour force.  This labour 
force would carry out the economic planning and policy as decreed by the Soviet state.  
The management of labour in the Stalinist era was characterised by a legal code structured 
around severe punitive measures to keep labour in line; the unions were expected to fit 
within this dynamic and trade union personnel were under severe threat if they did not 
comply.  (McCauley, 199; Deutscher, 1973; Seigelbaum, 1988;  Filtzer, 1992).  With 
Stalin’s death in 193, an easing of the atmosphere was initiated.  Labour and trade union 
policy underwent a shift at this time, from viewing individual members of the proletariat 
as enemies of the people, to formally viewing the proletariat as a vital and even positive 
element of the production process.  A new labour code was developed in 19; trade union 
structures were criticised for not having defended workers during the Stalinist years, and 
‘re-education’ became the tool of disciplining within the sphere of labour.  
The important role of resource allocation of social goods and commodities continued 
for the unions, and for a fractional contribution from wages, trade union members were 
eligible for such perquisites.  Activism within the official trade union structure also assisted 
individuals in the allocation process.  These roles and eligibility to access were carried out 
through interpersonal and politically unbalanced power relations.8   Trade unions served 
a vital function to distribute goods and services in an economy with a wholly-planned 
system of production and exchange.
In the managed economy’s system of trade union allocation of goods and services, the loss 
of a job meant the loss of housing, food coupons, day care, and other necessary elements 
of life.  The unions allocated these resources to those workers who were seen to reflect 
the ideological standards of Soviet propaganda; the controlled access and allocation of 
such necessities served as a vital tool in labour disciplining.  In this the trade unions 
were not established nor situated to promote, protect, and defend workers’ rights within 
the enterprises, but rather to manage the allocation of ‘rewards’ (housing, pay packets, 
foodstuffs) to all members of the enterprise, from the executive manager on down to the 
vakhtyor who monitored building access.
8  See Ledeneva (1998: 29) on blat (the word can loosely be translated as ‘connections’ or ‘contacts’) as 
it played out in social benefit allocations. Sarah Ashwin identifies social benefits provision conducted 
through the trade union structures as “state paternalism” (1999b: 11) and that benefit distribution was 
resolved through individualised, personalised contacts (1999b: 14).  Thus workers approach the trade 
union and enterprise elite as supplicants, rather than as subjects; although this “does something to 
improve the standing of the union, it does nothing to transform the nature of workers’ relationships 
to either the union or their employer”  (Ashwin, 1999b: 100).  In her recent research on trade union 
approaches to ‘social partnership’ and conflict resolution through an avoidance of strikes, see Ashwin 
(2004).
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It was this tradition of trade unions in the service of maintaining labour peace and the 
management of the social that perestroika inherited in the 1980s.  Highly centralised 
and structured through enterprise-based lines in city-wide, regional, and national 
configurations, Soviet trade unions as institutions, and the personnel placed therein, were 
ill-equipped for systemic changes.  Despite calls for the unleashing of energy from below 
in order to foster a vibrant civil society, perestroika-era trade unions were in no way 
fitted out for this task,  nor were trade unions equipped to manage, let alone lead, in the 
fractious labour relations which arose as the USSR collapsed.  The unions were structured 
to implement central policy in production targets and allocate rewards, and little more. 
The enterprise-based structure of the trade union, and that enterprise’s dependence upon 
the centre, further limited any proliferation of vibrant trade union and civic activity to 
address the Soviet economic and political stagnation.  
Thus historically close relations with enterprise management and state structures of 
governance were an outcome of the system of production, with each enterprise itself fit into a 
nation-wide, industry-wide, and highly integrated scheme of production and consumption. 
Competition for all resources, including labour, compelled a mindset that saw labour and 
management in enterprise, regional, sectoral, and ministerial segments working together 
to ensure a share of total resource allocation in the national economy.  To not work in 
concert with each other would almost assuredly lead to a breakdown of the enterprise’s 
place in the overall scheme of production, not to mention potentially bringing down the 
wrath of the Soviet government upon the enterprise and trade union management.  
Although Western political regimes were able to give credence to trade unions as critical 
institutions in civil society, a number of commentators have argued that this was not the 
case in post-Soviet Russia (Connor, 1991, Cook, 1997; Cook, Orenstein and Rueschemeyer, 
1999; Weigle, 2000; Howard, 2003; Mandel 2004).  The Soviet history and culture of 
Russian unions, and their enterprise-structured approach to representation, meant that 
the unions thus constituted were beyond redemption as institutions which represented the 
interests of workers.  With a labour relations approach that emphasises ‘social partnership’ 
with government and industry, the traditional trade unions contravened international norms 
with the continued formal inclusion of all enterprise staff, including senior managers. 
Efforts to form ‘independent’ unions, particularly in the mining industry, met with limited 
success and showed a disappointing lack of solidarity with other sectors of the Russian 
economy.  Yet as harbingers of the possible they provided promising examples of potential 
labour transformation, perhaps most particularly to the international labour community.
Scholars have also illustrated the important manner in which the inheritances of the Soviet 
era have shaped post-Soviet trade union responses to the chaos of the post-Soviet era 
(Clarke et.al., 1993; Clarke, 199; Ashwin, 1999b; Burawoy and Verdery, 1999, Ashwin and 
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Clarke, 2002; Mandel, 2004).   Ashwin makes an important contribution in historicising 
‘worker solidarity’ in the context of the Soviet experience.  The labour collective is, she 
notes, the site of crucial social support and of conflict, in that “the common interests of 
workers and managers in relation to the outside world co-existed with sharp conflicts of 
interest between [these] two groups within the enterprise…this contradiction had a huge 
influence on workers’ subjective collective identification (i.e. as a class), both in the Soviet 
era and during the transition” (Ashwin 1999b:  8-9).  
 
Thus the circumscribed role of the trade unions limited their role and efficacy in 
transformation to defenders of workers’ rights.   Stolid, unimaginative trade union 
structures remained in place, although at the national level the overarching federation 
of trade unions, formerly the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (ACCTU), was 
reborn within the Russian Federation as the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of 
Russia (FNPR).9  The FNPR inherited the structure and property of the ACCTU, and 
also inherited its membership:  in 1998, the FNPR via its local and regional trade union 
structures claimed membership of some 0 million of Russia’s 72 million strong labour 
force.10
 
In these circumstances, Western trade unions were of limited assistance.  There was, of 
course, a long history of tense relations in the international labour movement during the 
Soviet era.  Trade union organisations such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
and the International Confederation of  Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) openly opposed the 
Bolsheviks and disavowed the Soviet communist project.  Resistance to Soviet and post-
Soviet trade unions remained characteristic of the ICFTU, which only admitted the FNPR 
to its membership in 2000.11  The attitude of separateness was an important component of 
the Cold War reality, a reality that, unfortunately, was initially carried over into the post-
Soviet period by the American labour behemoth, the AFL-CIO.
The AFL-CIO began its overt activities in Moscow in 1992, with the opening of the Free 
Trade Union Institute (FTUI).12  The FTUI was committed to the Yeltsin regime’s transition 
9  In Russia, Federatsyia Nezavisimikh Profsoyuzov Rossii.  
10  Membership in 2007 is listed at 27,800,000, an approximate 38% of the Russian labour force. By 
way of contrast the AFL-CIO membership is listed as 8,400,400, and the US has an estimated 14% 
of unionised workers the labour force.  See the International Trade Union Confederation website for 
membership information.  For data on labour force size collected by the Central Intelligence Agency, 
see The World Factbook:  Russia and The World Factbook:  the United States (2007: online) and 
Herzenberg’s “Reinventing the United States Labour Movement, Inventing Postindustrial Prosperity: 
A Progress Report” (2000: online).
11  The ICFTU was dissolved in 200 when it merged with the World Confederation of Labour to 
form the International Trade Union Confederation; FNPR remains a member of the ITUC.
12 The Free Trade Union Institute had a long history in parts of the world with labour environments 
causing anxiety in American power structures. Harry Kelber (2004) provides a brief history of the 
AFL-CIO and FTUI.  In late December 2002, FTUI Director Irene Stevenson was barred from re-
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to a free market economy.  Such a position became increasingly tenuous with respect 
to two particular positions.  First, the FTUI chose only to work with what it considered 
‘independent’ unions - in particular, those it helped to organise and fund - and not the main 
representatives of the Russian labour force, the FNPR and its member organisations.  This 
left the wealthy American organisation the possibility of working with less than 30% of 
the Russian labour force.  Such a tactic served only to further split a labour movement that 
was structurally, culturally, and imaginatively flat on its back.  By choosing its partners 
on this basis, such a strategy was, in fact, simply a small scale replication of the support 
given to Yeltsin and his cohorts as appropriate and worthy beneficiaries.  Neither approach 
mobilised nor democratised representative organisations or the broader society.  Secondly, 
upholding support for the Yeltsin regime in fostering social partnerships in the context 
of wage arrears required a convoluted leap of logic that most Russian workers found 
impossible to make.
The insistence of the AFL-CIO and other Western unions that Russian counterparts be 
self-financed through membership dues was increasingly nonsensical; workers weren’t 
being paid on a consistent basis, if at all, precluding the possibility of a dues check-off 
system.  Short of foreign financing, the only practical methods available to support the 
functioning of unions were to continue to accept payments, or promises of payments, from 
enterprise management, retain the office space available in enterprises, and to introduce 
extracurricular for-profit schemes.  Trade unions were conducting chocolate bar drives, 
selling eggs and panty-hose, and looking to create insurance schemes; more lucrative trade 
union structures in Russia turned profits on casinos and resorts.  
Despite their lackluster performance in the defense of labour, and the almost invisible 
pace of transformative efforts to become organisations responsive to their membership, 
the traditional trade unions remain the most readily available concept and experience 
of worker representation to the Russian labour force.  Discounting their relevance, or 
demanding that they be ‘like us,’ loses sight of the extent to which they remained relevant 
to Russian workers, particularly during the Yeltsin era when the trade union role of goods 
allocation became even more important in daily life.  In the absence of representative 
and responsive governance and institutions of market relations, the state not surprisingly 
remained the focus of protest for the traditional unions.  To reject working with the 
traditional unions out of hand, because their leadership was not radical enough and their 
organisational principles reflecting local traditions of a corporatist ethic, can be perceived 
as once again closing off the debate with Russians in a manner akin to elite discourse on 
‘there is no alternative.’  
Trade union responses to the new imperatives of a liberal market and the global economy 
entry into Russia, effectively closing down the FTUI activities.  The Free Trade Union Institute has 
been globally reorganised as the Solidarity Center; although activities within Russia are circumspect 
the Center is actively engaged in other areas of the former Soviet sphere.
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mitigated against amelioration of deteriorating social and economic conditions, as well as 
against  substantive participatory democracy.  The post-Soviet transition to a market economy 
converged into a Western-supported superpresidentialism, a new style of authoritarian 
Russian rule which once again demobilised the population at large and fostered a politics 
of irresponsibility on the part of the Yeltsin regime, a lesson in governance requisite of 
modern liberal democracy that was not lost on Russia’s subsequent president, Vladimir 
Putin.  Thus, the bewailing of the ‘authoritarian’ nature of  Putin on the part of Western 
leaders is not a little disingenuous; the activities of foreign governments in legitimising 
Yeltsin’s democratic authoritarianism laid the foundation for Putin’s unabashed style of 
‘strong governance.’
In Yeltsin’s Russia, transformative intervention was carried out in collaboration with 
powerful Western support.  The post-Soviet experience reinforces the assessment of 
Macpherson the challenge to decoupling authoritarian market relations and the project 
of human development.  Similarly, the era shows the nature of state simplification 
and authoritarian high modernism characterised by Scott.  Within the paradigm of 
contemporary liberal democracy, a transition to democracy remains successful insofar as 
that transition limits the area of debate.  What is important is not democratic participation 
per se, but rather, the establishment of liberal democratic rules of conduct (McFaul, 2001). 
The establishment of private property, wage labour, and market allocation of resources 
are fundamental; once these are established, civilised discourse will allow any remaining 
or newly-arising problems to be resolved within a formal political sphere shorn of social 
substance, but operating within the rule of liberal law.
The post-Soviet systemic transformation involved limiting the sphere of debate upon 
the withdrawal of the state from property ownership and control.  During the 1990s, 
Russia was the subject of a liberal capitalist project which was constructed and carried 
by a numerically small but powerful group of political and financial leaders within the 
country, and with the elite international financial, political, and academic support.  But 
rather than fostering a democratic system, Russia’s transition to democracy reinforced an 
anti-democratic authoritarianism.  This was accomplished through the solidification of 
power to Western-supported and Western-designated ‘democrats’ (Wedel, 1998; Cohen, 
2000; Reddaway and Glinski, 2001).  In the 1990s, democracy came to be identified solely 
with support for Yeltsin and his cronies; the resulting ‘superpresidentialism’ in Russian’s 
historical context, simply meant a continuation of authoritarianism while laying the basis 
for the abdication of responsibility for the state of society and economy on the part of 
the post-communist elite.  In Western liberal analyses, Yeltsin was portrayed as a victim 
of circumstances, and liberal democracy once again showed a remarkable lack of self-
reflexivity in assessments of Russia’s transition to democracy (Weigle, 2000; McFaul, 
2001; Morgan, 2007).  
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It fell to the Yeltsin regime to shear the political agenda that had been widened in the 
late perestroika period, and the regime admirably did so.  This shearing away of that 
which may be debated is the sine qua non of liberal democracy.  Indeed, Russia’s difficult 
transition in the 1990s was not due to listening to the wrong liberals, but rather, was 
characteristic of liberalism itself.    
The Experience of Liberal Disciplinary Measures
The elimination of hyper-inflation, that important macro-indicator of Western economies, 
was hailed as a great leap forward in normalising Russia’s economy.  A further move in 
this direction was the creation of a banking system, yet some 3,000 neophyte banks by 
1994 – whittled down to 1,00 by 1998 - existed in a largely unregulated system with 
haphazard roles being assigned for and created by them.  In such an unregulated context, 
rapacious chaos combined with fiscal imagination was the order of the day (Pettingill, 
1998; Menshikov, 199).  Bartering became the norm serving as yet one more convoluted 
element of Russia’s transition to capitalism.  Despite these elements of crisis, the Russian 
economy was categorised as one of the high-performing ‘emerging’ economies, and 
international financial institutions kept lending to, courting, and supporting the Yeltsin 
regime:  from a $3.8 billion USD Soviet external debt in 1989 to, a decade later, an 
estimated $140 billion USD (Simon, 1999).  
Perhaps the most characteristic social marker during the Yeltsin regime was that of the 
phenomenon of non-payment.  From governments to their suppliers, civil servants and 
social benefit recipients, amongst firms in economic exchanges, and between firms and 
their employees, debts were incurred but were simply not paid.  Non-payment problems 
ballooned during the decade as the old economic structures of intra-union payment were 
abandoned in favour of formally stated market-oriented and profit-oriented methods, but 
these new structures were being put into place with no systematic, over-arching agency or 
agent responsible for enforceability.
Local firms and individuals adapted to the situation in a variety of ways. Debts and taxes 
were often paid in kind:  one oil industry joint venture paid utility bills via a donation of 
used computer equipment; further payments were made by offering computer training 
and expertise.  ‘Taxes’ were paid to municipalities through bartering of equipment and 
labour – in one reported instance, road crews were utilised to repave municipal roads 
in the Khanty-Mansisk district of Nizhnevartovsk in order to pay company taxes.  Not 
surprisingly, companies could mutually reinforce activities to sustain themselves better 
than Russia’s citizens.13   For unpaid workers, barter transactions belied the ability for 
claimants to ascertain governmental or enterprise revenues, limiting the possibility of 
assessing how much money has changed hands or is in governmental revenues.
13  Desai and Idson (2001: ) use 199 data to note that “[o]nly 1% of the 2. million enterprises 
registered in the country paid [wages] in full and on time.”  
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The historical tradition of collaboration with enterprise management and government, 
along with the generalised collapse of political and economic structures characteristic of 
Yeltsin’s Russia, left Russian trade unions confounded in the 1990s.  With very limited 
exceptions, trade unions in Russia were  inherited from the Soviet era and structured so as 
to receive production guidelines and commands fitting into the overarching order of things 
- that role collapsed with the overarching order itself.  They were to transmit the goods 
and services accrued to their constituency - that method of accrual similarly collapsed as 
state allocation dissolved and market mechanisms were put forward.  But the constituency 
remained, and the need for trade unions’ historical role in the allocation process was, 
in fact, reinforced in the post-Soviet era of the 1990s.  This was especially the case of 
monogoroda, single-industry cities in isolated locations, where the community’s economic 
dependency upon a single employer rendered the populace and the municipalities severely 
limited in finding options for an alternative tax base, employment, housing, or other social 
elements of life. 
Given the manner in which unions were developed, and individual employees were 
integrated into consumption and commodity access patterns through trade unions, labour 
‘solidarity’ was oriented toward the management of social life.  As this collapsed and with 
no clear-cut authority or obligations claimed by enterprises or government, there was no 
discernible structure nor agent to confront.  Nor was any agency or individual claiming 
responsibility for social and economic conditions.  Yet political and economic unravelling 
did not foster revolt, but rather than ethic of paralysis, rather than passivity, in terms of 
protest; the cultural history of totalitarian power contributed to the fostering of a citizenry 
unsure of how to proceed.  Not that protests didn’t occur; they certainly did.  But as one 
Siberian resident said in a personal interview with the author during the autumn of 1998, 
“it takes energy to fight; we’re too busy living.” 
Such a context acted to perpetuate individual dependence upon personal connections within 
the unions and society more generally, and to perpetuate the traditionally acquiescent role 
of the trade unions within the productive structure.  It was particularly in this context of 
the spiralling non-payment crisis and unclear lines of responsibility that post-Soviet trade 
unions floundered as the 1990s wore on.   Developing new activists, and a new way of 
thinking about labour relations, proved a profoundly difficult task.  In the late perestroika 
years, fractured relations abounded between various leftist and labour organisations. 
The unions as a representational force were largely discredited with the collapse of a 
regime which had predicated its propaganda upon the basis of claims to represent labour. 
Both structurally and in the concrete personalities involved, the trade unions’ collusive 
practices with management were prolonged by the very chaos that arose from the collapse 
of the command economy.  Soviet trade unions’ historical role in benefits allocation was 
perpetuated as ‘the market’ clearly was unable to provide.  Even in instances where goods 
Trade Unions in the Comfort Zone: Liberal Authority in Yeltsin’s Russia
54
might become locally available, the lack of wage payments prevented purchasing power by 
any incipient consumer base.  As the market appeared further and further from the reaches 
of Russia’s citizens, the dependence on self-production of food became increasingly 
important for survival (Kitching, 1998; Artemov, 1998; Desai and Idson, 2000).  
The focus of frustration, for employers and workers, appeared to remain in important ways 
turned upon the political and economic centre, in particular, with the federal governmental 
structures based in Moscow, and any basis for social and political change was more readily 
perceived to be between workers and enterprises against the government (Ashwin, 1999a; 
1999b; 2004; Burawoy and Verdery, 1999; Ashwin and Clarke, 2002).  This dynamic 
reinforced the diffused nature of ‘making do’ in post-Soviet society, and supported the 
perpetuation of an ethic of political irresponsibility on the part of unions as well as of the 
Yeltsin regime.
 
The Russian wage arrears crisis provided an exemplary circumstance which illustrated 
difficulty in carefully attributing blame and exercising power accordingly.   As Deborah 
Javeline notes,  “thoughtful and accurate assessment of a problem’s origins and solutions 
can often get in the way of collective action because many problems of the contemporary 
social and economic world have highly complicated origins and solutions and are likely to 
defy simple explanations” (2003: 108). 14  Such thoughtful, accurate assessment is highly 
valued in liberal society, and the evolving emphasis upon rational discourse - lest one 
be confused for an unreconstructed communist - discouraged protest in the context of 
undifferentiated responsibility.  
In the post-Soviet era East and West, the discourse of elections and elite policy management 
was constructed within the paradigm of liberal democracy and subject to the vagaries of 
the market.  The market, of course, is claimed to operate outside the substantive exercise 
of power of trade unions and political leaders, yet it sets the terms of social, political, and 
economic debate.  The specifics of the Yeltsin era reflect the history and context of post-
Soviet Russia, but are easily recognisable as outcomes of liberal democracy’s authoritarian 
nature and context shorn of participation (or even the need for participation) that would 
constitute a vibrant democratic polity.  The post-Soviet experience does not only highlight 
the authoritarian nature of Russia, but rather, it highlights the comfortable fit of liberal 
democracy with an authoritarian politics.
Within liberal democracies,  trade unions are superfluous to economic management 
and decision-making, although important to the maintenance of labour peace within 
unionised environments.  In post-Soviet Russia, the trade union culture of management-
union collaboration had a longer shelf-life than the accepted paradigms which had created 
the culture.  The trade unions in their post-Soviet manifestation were carried forward 
14  Crowley and Ost (2001: 204)  also note the challenges to effective protest in a climate of diffused 
political responsibility.
Trade Unions in the Comfort Zone: Liberal Authority in Yeltsin’s Russia
55
by inertia and, paradoxically, their role as social benefits providers in Yeltsin’s Russia 
was reinforced when the market and the state did not step in to manage the provision 
of social and economic goods necessary for the maintenance of its constituency.  The 
unions existed in the Yeltsin era, then, through a persisting dynamic of collaboration with 
enterprise management, and remained focused upon the centralised state structures and 
personnel in Moscow.  In the absence of political accountability for economic decision-
making processes, with the tradition of enterprise-focused worker representation, and with 
day-to-day survival as a full-time job, such a focus made sense. 
Similarly, efforts to organise working class parties were unable to take root in the Yeltsin 
era.1  In the 199 and 1999 elections, efforts were made to have trade unionists elected to 
the State Duma, while the trade unions continued with their top-down approach toward 
coalition-building, to the detriment of electoral success.  Lacking the political cachet, 
funding priorities, and limited democratic will to organise themselves, national trade 
union structures joined in a remarkably unsuccessful alliance with powerful enterprises 
managers.  Despite the calls from the centre for such an alliance, Clarke (2001: 47) 
notes that “branch and regional trade union organisations were embedded in their own 
structures of social partnership and were not willing to compromise their positions for the 
sake of solidarity with the FNPR leadership.”  Independent unions did not fare any better; 
their miniscule membership alone did not provide electoral numbers to successfully elect 
working class blocs of representatives in the Duma.  Such ‘strong leader’ allegiances 
and approaches to representative politics serve not only to reinforce social partnership 
objectives, but to reinforce the authoritarian nature of liberal democratic politics.
The Authority of Liberal Democracy
In 1991, Soviet leaders declared defeat and accepted liberal democracy as the new model 
to pursue in Russian development initiatives.  Free markets and democracy were the 
rallying cry to be adopted, based upon the wealth of experience of economic and political 
knowledge gleaned from Western presentations of its own path to liberal democracy and 
capitalist markets.  In the new paradigm, getting the state out of business would rationalise 
economic distortions and allow the unfettered economic forces of the country to develop. 
Market signals rather than planners would be the new agents of history.  The West would 
advise and, as necessary, give financial aid, loans and technical expertise to Russia.  
Yet despite their own demands to depoliticise the economy, both Western supporters and 
Russia’s Westernisers continued to prop up the new development model by propping up 
the politicians themselves.  Democracy could only be created with a strong hand.  Support 
for the Yeltsin regime came to be identified with support for liberal democratic reforms 
(Lukin, 1999; Cohen, 2000; Reddaway and Glinski, 2001).  The President was a law unto 
1  Of course, the questionable efficacy of working class parties in established democracies highlights 
the problems of such parties in defending workers’ rights in any case – witness Canadian Auto 
Workers President Buzz Hargrove’s alliance with the Liberal Party in the 2007 federal election, and 
noted resistance to “the insanity of the environmental movement” (Canadian Press, 2007: online).
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himself, and presidential decrees were the basis by which significant transformations 
were made to economy and society.  As Sokolowski (2003: 422) notes, Yeltsin “sought 
to construct the president as ruler of those who govern, rather than one who is himself 
responsible for governing.”  The result was that the Russian government itself lacked 
accountability, and the President ruled by decree and gave little indication of interest in 
the concerns of the population.
As the regime bumbled through the decade, growing and increasingly vocal discontent 
with the regime’s decisions and policies were evidenced.  By the summer of 1998, 
international lenders as well as the Russian labour movement increasingly voiced disgust 
with the regime and the reform process.  The early part of the summer saw an increased 
popular willingness to protest.  A favourite tactic that summer was the blockading of 
the Trans-Siberian railway, which had been used by pensioners in 1997 to protest unpaid 
pensions.  Miners in the Kemerovo region of Siberia began blockading the railway again 
in July of 1998, holding up cargo trains but initially allowing passenger trains through 
(Moscow Times, 1998).  The stated reason for the protest was that a similar ‘rail war’ had 
been called off three months earlier when Yeltsin promised the payment of back wages 
and retraining money would be forthcoming - it was not.  The Kemerovo blockade was 
lifted by 19 July, but unpaid workers in Sakhalin then used the same tactic to squeeze out 
a portion of back wages owing.  Later that month, some fifty coal miners in the Russian 
Far East took the local mine director hostage in his office (Saradzhyan, 1998).   And in 
Moscow, a protest of several hundred coal miners encamped in front of the White House 
was joined by 1,00 unpaid defence industry workers.  
The trade unions, particularly the FNPR, supported these short-term actions but declined 
to lead; as Ashwin and Clarke note, “the FNPR leadership was always afraid that its 
demonstrations would compromise its democratic credentials...” (2002: 0).  At the trade 
union level as well, then, leadership operated through a diffusion of responsibility, and 
lack of leadership in response to the making of a market society constituted ‘democracy.’ 
Something in this taut context of economy and society would have to give; it did, with the 
event of the August 1998 rouble meltdown, a signal of ineffectual politics that likewise 
deflated the efforts of liberal democratic regimes to continue with the fallacy that Yeltsin’s 
presidency would yield stability, prosperity and democracy.
Immediately following the rouble crisis of August 1998, an international navel-gazing 
exercise was undertaken on the question of ‘Who lost Russia?’  The IMF, the democrats, 
the communists, the oligarchs, the privatisers, and the people were all named as culprits for 
the failure of reforms, by virtue of being too lenient, too interventionist, too obstructionist, 
too greedy, too fast or too slow, and of course, too passive.  A self-reflexive look at liberal 
democracy itself, as a project of social, political, and economic organisation that claims to 
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enfranchise populations and satisfy needs, was certainly called for; once more in history, 
however, that opportunity was squandered.
Liberalism and the Politics of Irresponsibility
The Yeltsin era to 1998 did not yield a market economy or a democratic polity.  However, 
the regime had learned new tactics of authority in the years since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  Unlike the Soviet era, the government of democratic Russia disavowed claims of 
political obligation to the citizenry.  The divesting of political and economic obligations, 
and the framing of responsibility and authority from Party to market, had limited and 
redirected the strategic focus whereby redress could be pursued.  
Facing an ephemeral foe proved beyond the imagination of trade unions that had been 
created and cultivated in a climate of corporatist, top-down policies, with little experience 
of initiating local, regional, or national strategies.  Withdrawal to the micro-level of life 
made immediate sense, but as a long-term strategy to effect change this had obvious limits. 
A fractious global labour movement is unsure how to picket the market, and in the Russian 
context, it was even less possible to figure out who exercised control even in the more 
immediate social and economic arena. 
Limited relevant concrete advice or assistance came from international labour organisations; 
the cultural differences in union mandates, structures and activities, compounded in the 
context of wage arrears and an underperforming liberal political economy were profound 
and difficult to overcome.  For individuals dependent upon personal relations of power to 
maintain basic conditions of life, the ‘market’ was even further away than the legendary 
tsar in Moscow.  A market removed political obligations of the bosses, and stripped away 
the social and economic facts of life which had been the responsibility of trade unions and 
enterprises.
With the implosion of Soviet power, and the avowed adoption of liberal democracy, formal 
validation was given to include the local citizenry as an active and vital element in political 
decision-making.  All members of the society would be entitled to participate in the decision-
making processes as community and society was rebuilt.  The trade unions, as nominally 
powerful representatives of the Russian majority, were conceptually and strategically 
situated to take up this mantle.  Yet in the context of non-payment, and governmental 
abdicated of responsibility for social services, a philosophy of social partnership and the 
traditional collaboration of enterprise trade unions with management counterpoised to the 
central government was strengthened.  With the lack of government funding to continue 
their activities, and the rising wage arrears crisis undermining membership funding of 
the unions, the trade unions relied increasingly upon the enterprises themselves in order 
to continue to exist.  The disintegration of Soviet power was complemented by the lack of 
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an alternative accountable agent to take this place.  The collapse of Soviet power meant 
the collapse of an identifiable agent of responsible (although unresponsive) authority, the 
Communist Party.  
The weak political response by Russian society was historically grounded in a centuries-
old discourse of authority.  Throughout modernity, Russia’s rulers and intellectual elite 
declared the strategic path which would secure the place of the polity amongst the civilised 
nations of the world.  This model was replicated within trade union structures, whereby the 
unions served the pedagogical function of disseminating Party policy, while encouraging 
the meeting of production standards through disciplinary recourse, social services, and 
commodity allocation in the command economy.  This reinforced a non-participatory 
ethic amongst the populace; the sphere of political responsibility, such as it existed, was 
that of the knowledgeable layers of society who could discern the overarching plan, and 
the place of various components of that plan.1
When Soviet power collapsed, the clearly-designated responsible party collapsed with it, 
and international supporters with solid liberal democratic expertise and credentials came 
to play a key role in the transition from communism.  Intervention from these experts was 
carried out with domestic support by a small group of powerful individuals, who were 
declared to have the capacity to understand the need for staying the course.  Given the 
intense degree of pressure which this new liberal vanguard were prepared to bring to bear, 
democratic participation was once again inhibited.  The focus for responsibility shifted 
from an omnipotent Communist Party to ephemeral market forces.  The declaration by an 
international and domestic elite that liberal democracy was the only alternative for Russia 
went hand in hand with the legitimating of a decree-happy, irresponsible and unresponsive 
President.
The historical marginalisation of all but authoritative agents of state power, and structures 
which fitted within that model of top-down direction, was rebranded in the name of liberal 
democracy and thus incorporated into the post-Soviet order.  Rhetoric aside, the Yeltsin era 
was no repetition of previous revolutionary experiences.   In the early twentieth century, 
the Bolsheviks had to work from a defensive position, one which required the  support of 
important political sectors of the population - most notably, the army, the peasantry, and 
the urban proletariat in conflict with global capitalism.  This is distinguished from the 
Yeltsin period, whereby the assumption of power was taken by an integrated elite already 
in place.  But a concerted effort to bring on side the international community was much 
more successful in 1991.  And if the Bolsheviks had been concerned with politicising 
complaints to the level of revolutionary fodder as charges against the tsarist system itself, 
the Yeltsin regime was concerned with depoliticising those complaints to the level of 
whining, laziness, and the classic inability of the majority of the population to see its ‘true’ 
1  See Baker and Thompson (forthcoming 2009) on the reinforced nature of authoritarianism in 
post-Soviet pedagogical practices in the practices of the liberal arts.
Trade Unions in the Comfort Zone: Liberal Authority in Yeltsin’s Russia
59
interests.  The project of human development noted by Macpherson as one component of 
liberal democracy had been decoupled in the Yeltsin era, and the establishment of liberal 
democracy was solely focused on the establishment of market relations.
The Soviet enterprises, and the trade unions fitted within that enterprise and national 
structure, faced profound difficulties in this context.  Liberalism’s efforts to narrow the 
focus of the political made it increasingly unlikely that the relationship between industry 
and labour would move beyond a coping strategy addressing the exigencies of the moment. 
As funds for the trade unions dried up, and as enterprises divested themselves of day 
care centres, housing, resort camps, health care and the like, the relationship between 
unions and enterprise manageers was strained.  But a continued focus upon collaborative 
sustenance in an era of social partnership left unions within their comfort zone of relevance 
as social partners with enterprise management, seeking to access resources through the 
consolidated power of governmental authority.  
With international consensus, then, the government of Russia went on the offensive 
against its population, and the history of centralised command to secure a better future 
was refitted into the discourse of liberal capitalist modernity.  In a leap of logic revealing 
an intense contempt of Russia’s population, democracy came to mean giving virtually 
unlimited power to a few declared democrats.  Support for Russian democracy came 
to mean support for Yeltsin and his economic dream team.   Political participation was 
exclusionary, with the active approval of liberal democratic governments and international 
financial institutions, and in the name of democracy itself.  Russia’s Yeltsin-era experience 
of liberal democracy branded any alternative strategies as reflecting intellectual ignorance 
of how the world ‘really’ worked, or reflected a neo-bolshevist desire to return to the 
communist past.
Unlike previous excursions into remaking Russian society, however, the Yeltsin-
era transition was undertaken with the authority and validation of liberal capitalist 
democracies.  This collaboration offers insight into the affinity between liberalism and 
the authoritarian legitimating of a politics of irresponsibility.  In the 1990s, powerful 
international commentators and political supporters of the regime declared democracy to 
be evident in Russia on the basis of formal mechanisms of legitimisation such as voting 
structures, a tripartite formal relationship between government, business, and labour, and a 
constitution declaring itself to be based upon liberal democratic principles and the rule of 
(property) law.  The unconscious assumption of liberal democracy noted by Macpherson 
were made unapologetically  manifest.    Scott’s proposed authoritarian high modernism 
as rendered manageable through a state simplification project of mapping the social 
ensured that the social and political substance of post-Soviet Russia were sheared from the 
administrative map.  Support for the Yeltsin regime became the necessary and sufficient 
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conditions for the creation of liberal democracy in Russia; the result was a closing off of 
the debate of alternative visions or substantive political participation.  Authoritarian power 
was perpetuated with the consensus of liberal capitalist democracy; the demobilisation of 
a popular politics was necessary to institutionalise economic reforms.  These authoritarian 
activities were carried out in the name of creating a social interest in the future; liberal 
democratic intent excused the illiberal, authoritarian outcomes.  The rhetorical and policy 
framing of the new order was simplified to a stark presentation beyond the scope of 
argument:  there was no alternative.
In 1995, Boris Kagarlitsky commented that “the self-confident heirs of the communist 
regime learned nothing from the regime’s fate” (199: 24).  I would disagree completely. 
The Yeltsin regime learned one of the most valuable lessons of modern history.  As in 
tsarism before it, Soviet communism collapsed so speedily in part because there was an 
easily-identified agent in power.  By claiming such power, responsibility is identified and an 
assault is more easily focused upon those structures of power.  Disallowing or discrediting 
public participation, and denying responsibility for the state of the union, is a much more 
successful way to ensure political impotence.  If you can accomplish this with the support 
and assistance of the ‘civilised’ world of capitalist liberal democracy, so much the better.
At the beginning of the Yeltsin era, Russians were presented with the ultimate liberal 
simplification:  there is no alternative.  Modern liberal democracy simplifies the social, 
political, and economic landscape so as to accommodate what the modern administrator 
wishes to bring into view for purposes of management.  This mantra of visual singularity 
encapsulates the simplification of modern liberal political dialogue.  The 1990s saw 
liberal democracies complicit with Russian elites in the post-Soviet transformation.  The 
proclamation of the universal applicability of Western economics verified the lack of 
options facing Russia.  But once again, debate and discussion, an arguably more democratic 
manner in which to foster a participatory polity, were left out of the equation.  The affinity 
between Russian authoritarianism and liberalism’s authority in declaring that ‘there is no 
alternative’ illustrate the limitations of contemporary politics.  The dilemma of getting 
to democracy is not reflective of the immaturity and unrealised potential of Russian 
political culture, but rather, of the authoritarian foundations of liberal modernity itself. 
The ‘shearing’ of participatory democracy is evidenced through Russia’s Soviet and post-
Soviet experience.  Political irresponsibility becomes normalised through these structures; 
liberal democracy’s self-presentation is distilled into the rejection of any alternative but 
this politics shorn of substance.
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